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The so called ‘shadow economy’ refers to work and ﬁnancial transactions that take place outside of
the view of public authorities. Colin C Williams writes on the scale of this problem in Europe, noting
that while the estimated size of the undeclared economy in the EU is around 18.4 per cent of GDP, it
is far larger in some eastern European and southern European countries. He argues that a mix of
deterrence measures, incentives, and indirect controls oﬀers the best route for governments to
bring undeclared work into the declared economy.
Across the world, many businesses and individuals hide some or all of their monetary transactions
from the public authorities either for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes. Clearly, they can gain beneﬁts
from doing so, but there are also signiﬁcant wider costs that result. This undeclared economy creates risks for the
health and safety of workers and damages working conditions, hinders employment creation, puts at greater risk the
ﬁnancial sustainability of social protection systems and undermines the legitimate business environment through
unfair competition.
How big is the problem?
Estimating the amount of undeclared work is akin to trying to count the number of rats in the sewers – by deﬁnition, it
is hidden from view. Consequently, indirect methods are often employed using proxy indicators such as the amount
of cash in circulation. The most widely-used indirect method – the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-
causes) technique – estimates the size of the undeclared economy in the European Union (EU) to be 18.4 per cent
of GDP, ranging from 7.6 per cent in Austria to 31.9 per cent in Bulgaria, with a clear East-West and North-South
divide (see Figure 1). No Western and Northern European countries have undeclared economies larger than the EU
average and most East-Central and Southern European nations have above average undeclared economies.
Figure 1: Size of the undeclared economy in Europe by country (2012, percentage of GDP)
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Note: Derived from Schneider (2013)
If all this undeclared work was declared, then European public expenditure could increase by around one-ﬁfth, and
healthcare expenditure for example could be doubled.
What activities take place in the undeclared economy?
A long-standing view has been that the undeclared economy involves low-paid waged work conducted under
‘sweatshop’ conditions. However, there is a continuum of wage levels in the undeclared economy, just as there is in
the declared economy. Although the mean wage is lower than in the declared economy, there is overlap, with some
undeclared waged work being higher paid than declared employment. There is also recognition that some declared
employees sometimes receive two wages from their employer; an oﬃcial declared salary and an additional
undeclared (‘envelope’) wage.
However, much undeclared work is self-employment. At one end are proﬁt-motivated varieties. These range from
‘bogus self-employment’, where a person works for one employer but is self-employed and pays no wage tax and
has no rights (e.g. dismissal protection, vacation entitlements), through to various forms of ‘proper’ self-employment.
This ranges from registered traders conducting a portion of their trade oﬀ-the-books, to unregistered enterprises
trading wholly oﬀ-the-books. One outcome has been a re-reading of the undeclared economy as a ‘hidden
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enterprise culture’. Indeed, in both OECD nations and developing countries, two-thirds of all businesses start-up
unregistered in the informal economy.
Yet other undeclared self-employment is more community-oriented and not market-like, ranging from for-proﬁt
entrepreneurs conducting jobs for social rationales (e.g. when an elderly person is charged less than the market
rate) to paid favours conducted for, and by, close social relations to help each other out (e.g. paying an unemployed
family member to do your decorating so as to give them money, which they would not otherwise accept because
they would see it as charity).
What can policy-makers do about it?
There are four hypothetical policy choices with regard to undeclared work: do nothing; move declared work into the
undeclared economy; eradicate the undeclared economy, or transfer undeclared work into the declared economy.
Table 1 summarises the various costs of the undeclared economy along with some potential beneﬁts that have been
so far less considered.
Table 1: Costs and beneﬁts of the undeclared economy
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Note: Derived from Williams (2014)
The table shows that doing nothing is unacceptable; it leaves intact the various costs on formal businesses,
undeclared enterprises and workers, customers and governments. The second option of de-regulating the declared
economy is also a non-starter because it results in a levelling down of working conditions. The third approach,
eradicating undeclared work, is unworkable because it would with one hand squash precisely the active citizenship
and entrepreneurship that with the other hand governments want to foster. Moving undeclared work into the
declared economy thus appears the most viable policy option. How, therefore, can this best be done?
4/6
Direct vs indirect controls
It is not easy to change the behaviour of businesses, workers and consumers. Conventionally, governments have
viewed participants as rational economic actors and sought to ensure that the costs of operating in the undeclared
economy are outweighed by the beneﬁts of operating in the declared economy. As Table 2 shows, this is
accomplished in the direct controls approach usually by using ‘sticks’ to punish non-compliant (‘bad’) behaviour (i.e.
negative reinforcement), although recent years have seen the increasing use of ‘carrots’ to reward compliant
(‘good’) behaviour (i.e. positive reinforcement).
Relatively less discussed in European policy circles until now has been the indirect controls approach which views
participants more as ‘social actors’ and instead focuses upon developing the social contract between the state and
citizens to engender a voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour and thus greater self-regulation.
Table 2: Policy measures for tackling Europe’s undeclared economy
Note: Derived from Williams (2014)
Interviewing senior government oﬃcials involved in tackling the undeclared economy in 31 European countries in
2010, 57 per cent stated that the use of ‘sticks’ (i.e. deterrence measures) is accorded the most importance in their
country, 33 per cent ‘carrots’ (i.e. incentive measures) and 10 per cent indirect controls.
However, these diﬀerent policy measures to harness this sphere are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, there are at
least two ways of combining them. Firstly, a responsive regulation approach starts out by openly engaging citizens
to consider their obligations and take responsibility for regulating themselves rather than need to be regulated by
external rules. This facilitating of voluntary self-regulated compliance is then followed by persuasion through
incentives and only as a last resort for the small minority refusing to be compliant does it use punitive measures.
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A second approach is the ‘slippery slope framework’ which pursues both voluntary and enforced compliance
concurrently by developing both greater trust in authorities and the greater power of authorities. Until now, however,
there has been little evaluation of which sequencing and/or combination is the most eﬀective means of harnessing
this sphere.
What is certain nevertheless, is that the currently dominant approach in Europe of using ‘sticks’ to elicit compliant
behaviour needs to change. The EU platform for tackling undeclared work currently being established by the
European Parliament could well facilitate this shift. Hopefully, it will do so.
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